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Abstract. We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among
self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with
different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently adapt
the amount of resources allocated to each of their collaborations in order to maximize
the obtained payoff. We show analytically that the system approaches a state in
which the agents make identical investments, and links produce identical benefits.
Despite this high degree of social coordination some agents manage to secure privileged
topological positions in the network enabling them to extract high payoffs. Our
analytical investigations provide a rationale for the emergence of unidirectional non-
reciprocal collaborations and different responses to the withdrawal of a partner from
an interaction that have been reported in the psychological literature.
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Cooperation is the basis for complex organizational structures in biological as well
as in social systems [1, 2]. The evolutionary and behavioural origin of cooperation is a
subject of keen scientific interest, because the ubiquity of cooperation in nature seems
to defy the often high costs incurred by the cooperating agent [3]. Evolutionary game
theory has identified several mechanism allowing for the evolution and persistence of
costly cooperation [4]. In particular the emergence of cooperation is promoted if the
interacting agents are distributed in some (potentially abstract) space, so that only
certain agents can interact at any given time [5–7]. In the context of social cooperation
spatial structure can be appropriately modeled by a complex network, in which nodes
represent agents, while the links correspond to collaborations. The topology of this
network, i.e., the specific configuration of nodes and links, has been shown to be of
central importance for the level of cooperation that evolves [8–12].
In social networks the topology is not static, but reacts to the behaviour of the
agents [13–18]. This defines an inherent dynamical interplay: While the agents’s
behaviour may depend on their topological neighbourhood, this neighbourhood is, at
least in part, shaped through the agent’s behavioural choices. Networks containing such
an dynamical interplay between the state of the nodes and the networks topology are
called adaptive networks [19, 20]. While adaptive networks have been studied for some
time in the social literature (e.g. [13, 21, 22]), pioneering work [23, 24, 26, 27] only
recently triggered a wave [25] of detailed dynamical investigations in physics. Recent
publications discuss simple cooperative games such as the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma
[9, 28–39], the iterated prisoner’s dilemma[40], and the snowdrift game [31, 32, 41]
on adaptive networks. They showed numerically and analytically that a significantly
increased level of cooperation can be achieved if individuals are able rewire their links
[9, 28–30, 38, 39, 41, 42] if links are formed and broken [31–34, 42, 43] or if new agents are
added to the network [36, 37]. Moreover, it has been shown that the adaptive interplay
between the agents’ strategies and the network topology can lead to the emergence of
distinguished agents from an initially homogeneous population [9, 27–29].
While important progress has been made in the investigation of games on adaptive
networks, it is mostly limited to discrete networks, in which the agents can only assume
a small number of different states, say, unconditional cooperation with all neighbours
and unconditional defection. By contrast, continuous adaptive networks have received
considerably less attention [22, 44, 45]. Most current models therefore neglect the ability
of intelligent agents to maintain different levels of cooperation with different self-chosen
partners [45].
In this paper we propose a weighted and directed adaptive network model in which
agents continuously and selectively reinforce advantageous collaborations. After a brief
description of the model, we show in Sec. 2 that the network generally approaches
a state in which all agents make the same total cooperative investment and every
reciprocated investment yields the same benefit. Despite the emergence of this high
degree of coordination, the evolved networks are far from homogeneous. Typically the
agents distribute their total investment heterogeneously among their collaborations, and
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each collaborations receives different investments from the partners. In Sec. 3, we show
that this heterogeneity enables resource fluxes across the network, which allow agents
holding distinguished topological positions to extract high payoffs. Thereafter, in Sec. 4,
we investigate further topological properties of the evolved networks and identify the
transition in which large cooperating components are formed. Finally, in Sec. 5, we
focus on the appearance of unidirectional (unreciprocated) investments. Specifically,
we identify three distinct scenarios in which unidirectional collaborations can arise and
discuss their implications for the interaction topology. Our conclusions are summarized
in Sec. 6.
1. Model
We consider a population of N agents, representing for instance people, firms or nations,
engaged in bilateral collaborative interactions. Each interaction is described by a
continuous snowdrift game [2], one of the fundamental models of game theory. In
this game, an agent i can invest an amount of time/money/effort eij ∈ R
+
0 into the
collaboration with another agent j. Cooperative investments accrue equal benefits B to
both partners, but create a cost C for the investing agent. Assuming that investments
from both agents contribute additively to the creation of the benefit, the payoff received
by agent i from an interaction with an agent j can then be written as
Pij = B (eij + eji)− C (eij) . (1)
The game thus describes the generic situation in which agents invest their personal
resources to create a common good shared with the partner.
As an example of the snowdrift game, the reader may think of a scientific
collaboration where two researchers invest their personal time in a project, while the
benefit of the publication is shared between them. This example makes it is clear that
the benefit of the collaboration must saturate when an extensive amount of effort is
invested, whereas the cost to the an agents, measured for instance in terms of personal
well-being, clearly grows superlinearly once the personal investment exceeds some hours
per day.
In the following we do not restrict the cost- and the benefit-functions, B and C, to
specific functional forms, except in the numerical investigations. However, we assume
that both are differentiable and, moreover, that B is sigmoidal and C is superlinear
(cf. Fig. 3). These assumptions capture basic features of real-world systems such as
inefficiency of small investments, saturation of benefits at high investments, as well as
additional costs incurred by overexertion of personal resources and are widely used in
the sociological and economic literature [46, 47].
To account for multiple collaborations per agent, we assume that the benefits
received from collaborations add linearly, whereas the costs are a function of the sum
of investments made by an agent, such that the total payoff received by an agent i is
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given by
Pi =
∑
j 6=i
Pij =
∑
j 6=i
B (σij)− C (Σi) . (2)
where Σi :=
∑N
j=1 eij denotes the total investment of the agent i while σij := eij + eji
denotes the total investment made in the collaboration ij. This is motivated by
considering that benefits from different collaborations, say different publications, are
often obtained independently of each other, whereas the costs generated by different
collaborations stress the same pool of personal resources of an agent.
Let us emphasize that we do not restrict the investment of an agent further.
While investments cannot be negative, no upper limit on the investments is imposed.
Furthermore, the agents are free to make different investments in collaborations with
different partners. Thus, to optimize its payoff, an agent can reallocate investments
among its potential partners as well as change the total amount of resources invested.
For specifying the dynamics of the network, we assume the agents to be selfish,
trying to increase their total payoff Pi by a downhill-gradient optimization
d
dt
eij =
∂
∂eij
Pi. (3)
Every agent can cooperate with every other agent. Thus, the network of potential
collaborations is fully connected and the deterministic time-evolution of the model
system is given by a system of N(N − 1) ordinary differential equations of the form
of Eq. 3. The network dynamics, considered in the following, is therefore only the
shifting of link weights eij . Note however that already the weight dynamics constitutes
a topological change. As will be shown in the following, the agents typically reduce
their investment in the majority of potential collaborations to zero, so that a sparse and
sometimes disconnected network of non-vanishing collaborations is formed. Therefore
the terminology of graph theory is useful for characterizing the state that the system
approaches. Below, we use the term link to denote only those collaborations that
receive a non-vanishing investment σij . A link is said to be bidirectional if non-
vanishing investments are contributed by both connected agents, while it is said to
be unidirectional if one agent makes a non-vanishing investment without reciprocation
by the partner. Likewise, we use the term neighbours to denote those agents that are
connected to a focal agent by non-vanishing collaborations and the term degree to denote
the number of non-vanishing collaborations in which a focal agent participates.
In the following, the properties of the model are investigated mostly by analytical
computations that do not require further specifications. Only for the purpose of
verification and illustration we resort to numerical integration of the ODE system. For
these we use the functions
B (σij) =
2ρ√
τ + ρ2
+
2(σij − ρ)√
τ + (σij − ρ)
2
, C (Σi) = µ (Σi)
2 .
For studying the time-evolution of exemplary model realizations by numerical
integration, all variables eij are assigned random initial values drawn independently
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Figure 1. Network of collaborations in
the final state. The nodes represent agents,
links correspond to collaborations receiving
non-vanishing investments σij . The small
dash on every link ij is a fairness indicator:
the further it is shifted toward one agent
i, the lower the fraction, eij/σij , of the
investment agent i contributes to the link.
Agents extracting more payoff are shown
in darker colour and are placed toward the
center of the community. The size of a dot
indicates the agents total investment Σi. In
the final configuration the network exhibits
a high degree of heterogeneity. Nevertheless
all agents make the same total investment
and all collaborations receive the same total
investment. (Parameters: ρ = 0.65, τ = 0.1,
µ = 1.5)
from a Gaussian distribution with expectation value 1 and standard deviation 10−14
constituting a homogeneous state plus small fluctuations. The system of differential
equations is then integrated using Euler’s method with variable step size h. In every
timestep, h is chosen such that no variable is reduced by more than half of its value in
the step. If in a given timestep a variable eij falls below a threshold ǫ << 1 and the
corresponding time derivative is negative, then deij/dt is set to zero for one step to avoid
very small time steps. We emphasize that introducing the threshold ǫ is done purely to
speed up numerical integration and does not affect the results or their interpretation.
In particular, we confirmed numerically that, the exact value of ǫ does not influence the
final configuration that is approached. In all numerical results shown below ǫ = 10−5
was used.
2. Coordination of investments
The numerical exploration of the system reveals frustrated, glass-like behavior; starting
from a homogeneous configuration as described above, it approaches either one of a large
number of different final configurations, which are local maxima of the total payoff.
A representative example of an evolved network, and snapshots from the time-
evolution of two smaller example networks are shown in Figs. 1,2, respectively. In the
example networks only those links are shown that receive a non-vanishing (i.e. above-
threshold) investment. Most of these non-vanishing links are bidirectional, receiving
investments from both of the agents they connect. Only rarely, unidirectional links
appear, which are maintained by one agent without reciprocation by the partner.
For further investigations it useful to define a bidirectionally connected component
(BCC) as a set of agents and the bidirectional links connecting them, such that, starting
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b
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Figure 2. Time evolution of example networks from a homogeneous state. The
different frames show snapshots of the network of collaborations at different times. a)
In small systems the network sometimes self-organizes to homogeneous topologies in
which all players extract the same payoff. b) If a player (arrow) tries to maintain too
many links at too low investment, his partners will cease reciprocating investments,
leading sometimes to unidirectional links.
from one agent in the set, every other agent in the set can be reached by following a
sequence of bidirectional links. In the numerical investigations we observe that all
bidirectional links within a BCC receive the same total investment in the final state.
However, the investment σij made in every given link is in general not split equally
among the two connected agents. Furthermore, all agents within a BCC make the
same total cooperative investment Σi in the final state. However, the investments eij
of one agent in different collaborations are in general different. The coordination of
total investments σij , Σi therefore arises although no agent has sufficient information to
compute the total investment made by any other agent.
We emphasize that the level of investments, which the agents approach is not set
rigidly by external constraints but instead depends on the topology of the network of
collaborations that is formed dynamically. This is evident for instance in differences of
up to 20 % between the level of investment that is reached in different BCCs of the
same network.
To understand how coordination of investment arises, we now formalize the
observations made above. We claim that in our model in the final state the following
holds: Within a BCC (i) every agent makes the same total investment, and (ii) either all
bidirectional links receive the same total investment or there are exactly two different
levels of total investment received by bidirectional links. For reasons described below,
the case of two different levels of total investment per link is only very rarely encountered.
In this case every agent can have at most one bidirectional link that is maintained at
the lower level of investment.
We first focus on property (i). This property is a direct consequence of the
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Figure 3. Adjustment of investments. Shown are the perceived cost functions C and
benefit functions B (insets) for the example of an agent 1 of degree one interacting
with an agent 2 of degree two (sketched). The function B depends on the sum of both
agents’ investments into the interaction while C depends on the sum of all investments
of one agent. In every equilibrium (SE or UE) stationarity demands that the slope
of these functions is identical. This requires that the agents make identical total
investments. In stable equilibria (SE), the operating point lies in general above the
inflection point (IP) of B, whereas equilibria found below the IP are in general unstable
(UE). Therefore, in a stable equilibrium both links produce the same benefit and both
agents make the same total investment.
stationarity of the final state. Consider a single link ij. Since both investments, eij
and eji, enter symmetrically into σij , the derivative of the benefit with respect to
either investment is ∂B(σij)/∂eij = ∂B(σji)/∂eji =: B
′(σij). Thus, if eij , eji > 0,
the stationarity conditions deij/dt = deji/dt = 0 require
∂
∂eij
C (Σi) = B
′(σij) =
∂
∂eji
C (Σj) . (4)
This stipulates that the slope of the cost of the two interacting agents must match the
slope of the shared benefit in the stationary state (Fig. 3). Due to the symmetry of Σi,
∂C(Σi)/∂eij = ∂C(Σi)/∂eik =: C
′(Σi) holds for all i, j, k. Therefore, Eq. (4) implies
C ′(Σi) = C
′(Σj). As we assumed C to be superlinear, C
′ is injective and it follows that
Σi = Σj =: Σ, such that i and j, are at a point of identical total investment. Iterating
this argument along a sequence of bidirectional links yields (i).
Let us remark that the stationarity of vanishing investments may be fixed due to
the external constraint that investments have to remain non-negative. The stationarity
condition for vanishing and uni-directional links, analogous to Eq. (4), is therefore
∂
∂eij
C (Σi) ≥ B
′(σij) ≤
∂
∂eji
C (Σj) . (5)
Because of the inequalities that appear in this equation, the argument given above does
not restrict the levels of total investment found in different components. For similar
reasons agents that are only connected by unidirectional links can sustain different
levels of investment, which is discussed in Sec. 5.
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We note that, although the network of potential interactions is fully connected,
no information is transfered along vanishing links. Therefore, the equation of motion,
Eq. 3, should be considered as a local update rule, in the sense that it only depends on
the state of the focal agent and on investments received from a small number of direct
neighbours.
In order to understand property (ii) we consider multiple links connecting to a
single agent i. In an equilibrium the investment into each of the links has to be such
that the slope of the benefit function of each link is identical. Otherwise, the payoff
could be increased by shifting investments from one link to the other. Since the benefit
function is sigmoidal, a given slope can be found in at most two points along the curve:
one above and one below the inflection point (IP). By iteration, this implies that if a
stationary level of investment is observed in one link, then the investment of all other
links of the same BCC is restricted to one of two values, which amounts to the first
sentence of (ii).
For understanding why the case of two different levels of investments is rarely
encountered the stability of steady states has to be taken into account. A local
stability analysis, based on linearisation and subsequent application of Jacobi’s signature
criterion, is presented in the appendix. We show that for a pair of agents ij connected
by a bidirectional link, stability requires
C ′′(Σi) > 0 ∧ 2B
′′(σij)− C
′′(Σi) < 0, (6)
and every pair of links ij and ik connecting to the same agent i has to satisfy
B′′(σik)B
′′(σij) > C
′′(Σi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(B′′(σik) +B
′′(σij)) . (7)
Note that Eq. (6) does not stipulate the sign of B′′(σij) as it only implies 2B
′′(σij) <
C ′′(Σi) > 0. As Eq. (6) applies also to the link ik, the same holds for B
′′(σik). We
therefore have to consider three different cases when testing the compatibility of Eq. (7)
with Eq. (6):
a) B′′(σik) < 0 and B
′′(σij) < 0, (both investments above the IP)
b) B′′(σik) > 0 and B
′′(σij) > 0, (both investments below the IP)
c) B′′(σik) > 0 and B
′′(σij) < 0 (one investment above and one below the IP).
In case a), Eq. (7) is trivially fulfilled as the left hand side has positive and the right
hand side negative sign. In case b), Eq. (7) and Eq. (6) are incompatible: estimating
the lower bound of the right hand side of (7) using the relation C ′′(Σ) > 2B′′(σij) leads
to the contradiction
:=X>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
B′′(σik)B
′′(σij) > C
′′(Σi) (B
′′(σik) +B
′′(σij))
> 2B′′(σij) (B
′′(σik) +B
′′(σij)) = 2B
′′(σij)B
′′(σik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=2X
+2 (B′′(σij))
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
This shows that in a stable stationary state, every agent can at most have one link
receiving investments below the IP. In case c), Eq. (7) can in principle be satisfied.
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However, the equation still imposes a rather strong restriction on a positive B′′ (σik)
requiring high curvature of the benefit function close to saturation. The restriction
becomes stronger, when the degree of agent i increases [48].
Bilateral links with investments below the IP can be excluded entirely, if the
benefit function approaches saturation softly, so that the curvature above the inflection
point remains lower or equal than the maximum curvature below the inflection point.
For such functions, every pair σik < σij of solutions to the stationarity condition
B′ (σij) = B
′ (σik) = C
′ (Σi) yields a pair of coefficients B
′′ (σik) > 0, B
′′ (σij) < 0
violating (7). In this case only configurations in which all links receive investments
above the IP can be stable and hence all links produce the same benefit in the stable
stationary states. This explains why the case of two different levels of cooperation is
generally not observed in numerical investigations if realistic cost and benefit functions
are used.
For understanding the central role the IP plays for stability consider that in the IP
the slope of B is maximal. Therefore, links close to the IP make attractive targets for
investments. If the total investment into one link is below the IP then some disturbance
raising (lowering) the investment increases (decreases) the slope, thus making the link
more (less) attractive for investments. Hence, below the IP, a withdrawal of resources
by one of the partners, no matter how slight, will make the collaboration less attractive,
causing a withdrawal by the other partner and thereby launching the interaction into
a downward spiral. Conversely, for links above the IP the gradual withdrawal of
resources by one partner increases the attractiveness of the collaboration and is therefore
compensated by increased investment from the other partner. In psychology both
responses to withdrawal from a relationship are well known [49]. The proposed model
can therefore provide a rational for their observation that does not require explicit
reference to long term memory, planning, or irrational emotional attachment.
For our further analysis property (ii) is useful as it implies that, although our model
is in essence a dynamical system, the BCCs found in the steady states of this system
can be analyzed with the tools of graph theory for undirected graphs. In the Secs. 3,
4 we go one step further and treat not only the BCC but the whole network as an
undirected graph. We thereby ignore the differences between directed and undirected
links in order to study properties such as the degree- and component-size distributions
before we continue in Sec. 5 with a more detailed investigation of directed links and
their topological implications.
3. Distinguished topological positions
Despite the coordination described above, the payoff extracted by agents in the final
state can differ significantly. This is remarkable because the agents follow identical
rules and the network of collaborations is initially almost homogeneous with respect to
degree, link weights, and neighbourhood.
Because all bidirectional links in a BCC produce the same benefit, the total benefit
Patterns of cooperation 10
k
p k
10 15 20 25
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
Figure 4. Degree heterogeneity in self-
organized networks of collaborations.
In comparison to a random graph
(black), the degree distribution of the
evolved networks is relatively narrow
(blue). Parameters are chosen to obtain
networks with identical mean degree.
Results are averaged over 100 networks
of size N = 100.
an agent receives is proportional to the degree of the agent. By contrast, the cost
incurred by an agent does not scale with the degree, but is identical for all agents in
the BCC, because agents of high degree invest a proportionally smaller amount into
their collaborations. Topological positions of high degree thus allow agents to extract
significantly higher benefits without requiring more investment.
The payoff distribution in the population is governed by the degree distribution pk
describing the relative frequency of agents with degree k. Figure 4 shows a representative
degree distribution of an evolved networks in the final state. While the finite width of the
distribution indicates heterogeneity, the distribution is narrower, and therefore fairer,
than that of an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph, which constitutes a null-model for randomly
assembled network topologies. We verified that variance of the evolved network is below
the variance of a random graph for the whole range of admissible mean degree k¯ in a
network of given size.
Although the snowdrift game is not a zero-sum game, payoffs cannot be generated
arbitrarily. In order to sustain the extraction of high payoffs by agents of high degree,
investments have to be redistributed across the network. In the definition of our model,
we did not include the transport of resources directly. Nevertheless, a redistribution
of investments arises indirectly from the asymmetry of the agents’ investments. This
is illustrated in Fig. 5. Consider for instance an agent of degree 1. This agent
necessarily focuses his entire investment on a single collaboration. Therefore, the partner
participating in this collaboration only needs to make a small investment to make the
collaboration profitable. He is thus free to invest a large portion of his total investment
into links to other agents of possibly higher degree. In this way investments flow toward
Figure 5. Redistribution of invest-
ments. Even in small networks invest-
ments flow toward agents of high con-
nectivity. This flow is apparent in the
position of the fairness indicators on the
links, cf. Fig. 1, caption.
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Figure 6. Giant component transition. (a) At k¯ = 1.91 the expected size 〈s〉 of a
network component changes from O(1) to O(N). (b) Even in the relatively small
networks of 100 nodes a power-law shape starts to appear in the component-size
distribution obtained from the final states of 750 network realizations with a mean
degree a mean degree k¯ = 1.91.
the regions of high degree where high payoffs are extracted.
4. Formation of large components
To explore the topological properties of the networks of collaborations in the final state
further, we performed an extensive series of numerical integrations runs in which we
varied all parameters in a wide range. These revealed that an important determinant
of the topology is the mean degree k¯ = 2L/N , where L denotes the number of
links and N the number of agents in the network. Given two evolved networks with
similar k¯, one finds that the networks are also similar in other properties such as the
component-size distribution, clustering coefficient, and the fraction of collaborations
that are unidirectional. We therefore discuss the topological properties of the evolved
networks as a function of k¯, instead of the original model parameters.
We first consider the expected size 〈s〉 of a network component to which a
randomly chosen agent belongs. In contrast to the BCC’s discussed above, unidirectional
collaborations are now taken into account in the computation of component sizes. The
value of 〈s〉 in the evolved network as a function of k¯ is shown in Fig. 6a. The
figure reveals that large components begin to appear slightly below k¯ = 2. Because
of the difficulties related to integrating N(N − 1) differential equations, our numerical
investigations are limited to networks of up to 100 agents. While it is therefore debatable
whether the observed behaviour qualifies as a phase transition, it can be related to the
giant component transition commonly observed in larger networks.
In the giant component transition a component is formed that scales linearly with
network size. In the absence of higher correlations the transition occurs at q¯ = 1 [50],
where q¯ is the mean excess degree of the network, i.e., the number of additional links
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found connected to a agent that is reached by following a random link.
In Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs, q¯ = k¯, therefore the giant component transition
takes place at k¯ = 1. In the present model the transition in 〈s〉 is shifted to higher values
of k¯ because of the nature of the underlying snowdrift game. The snowdrift game favors
cooperation in the sense that for an agent of degree zero it is always advantageous to
initiate an interaction. Therefore k¯ = 1 is the lowest possible value that can be observed
in evolved networks. Further, any evolved network with k¯ = 1 invariably consists of
isolated pairs, which precludes the existence of a giant component. Finally, the relatively
narrow degree distribution of the evolved networks implies q¯ < k¯ and therefore k¯ > 1
at the transition.
To estimate an upper limit for the connectivity at which the giant component
transition occurs, it is useful to consider degree homogeneous networks. In these
networks the degree distribution is a delta function and q¯ = k¯−1, so that the transition
occurs at k¯ = 2. In the networks evolved in the proposed model we can therefore expect
a critical value of k¯ between one and two. Based on numerical results we estimate that
the giant component transition in the present model occurs at k¯ ≈ 1.91 (Fig. 6). At
this value a power-law distribution of component sizes, which is a hallmark of the giant-
component transition, begins to show already in relative small networks with N = 100.
5. Unreciprocated collaborative investments
While in Sec. 2 we have mainly considered bidirectional links, and in Sec.3 and 4
only distinguished between vanishing and non-vanishing links, we will now focus on
unidirectional links, which one partner maintains without reciprocation by the other.
The presence of such links in collaboration networks was recently discussed in detail by
[44].
For the discussion below it is advantageous to consider the mean degree of agents
in a connected component 〈k〉 = 2l/n, where n and l are the number of agents and links
in the component. Note that in large components 〈k〉 ≈ k¯ while the two properties can
be significantly different in small components. In contrast to k¯, 〈k〉 allows us to infer
global topological properties: Components with 〈k〉 < 2 are trees. Components with
〈k〉 = 2 contain exactly one cycle to which trees might be attached. And, components
with 〈k〉 > 2 contain more than one cycle, potentially with trees attached.
As in the previous section, the term component refers to maximal subgraphs
which are connected by bidirectional and/or unidirectional links. According to this
definition a component may, beside one or more BCCs, contain agents, which only have
unidirectional links. In the following we denote the set of these agents as the non-BCC
part of the component (nBCC). For the sake of simplicity we focus on components
which contain only one BCC, but note that the case of multiple BCCs can be treated
analogously.
Unlike the BCC, the nBCC is not a subcomponent but only a set of agents which
are not necessarily connected. Nevertheless, numerical results show that (i*) all nBCC
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Figure 7. Unidirectional investments and proportion of unidirectional links. (a) The
ratio between the investment in unidirectional and the investment in bidirectional links
from the same component, σn/σn, equals 1 for 〈k〉 = 2m, m ∈ N. σn/σb > 1 applies
to 〈k〉 > 2 6= 2m, σn/σb < 1 to 〈k〉 < 2. (b) For 〈k〉 < 2 the average proportion
of unidirectional links (PUL) features discrete peaks. As every tree must have a
bidirectional core, the smallest 〈k〉 with non-zero PUL is 〈k〉 = 4/3. It corresponds to
components with 3 agents and 2 links one of which can be unidirectional.
agents make the same total investment Σn and (ii*) all unidirectional links maintained
by nBCC agents receive the same total investment σn. While property (ii*) can be
understood analogously to property (ii) of BCCs, property (i*) cannot be ascribed to
stationarity or stability conditions but seems to result from optimality restrictions. As
a consequence of the properties (i*) and (ii*) the number of outgoing links m := Σn/σn
is identical for all agents in the nBCC.
So far we have decomposed a component into the BCC and the nBCC. Within each
subset, all agents make the same total investment, and all links receive the same total
investment, therefore each subset can be characterized by two parameters, Σb, σb for
BCC and Σn, σn for the nBCC. To recombine the subsets and infer properties of the
whole component, we need to study the relation between these four parameters.
The central question guiding our exploration is, why do agents not start to
reciprocate the unidirectional investments. The lack of reciprocation implies that the
unidirectional links are either less attractive or just as attractive as bidirectional links.
We distinguish the two scenarios
a) B′(σb) = B
′(σn),
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a b
Figure 8. Topological arrangement of unidirectional links (shown in red). (a) For
〈k〉 < 2, unidirectional links connect individual nBCC agents with a BCC core. (b)
For 〈k〉 ≥ 2 unidirectional links are arranged in long chains which is shown here for
〈k〉 = 2. For 〈k〉 > 2 typical components become too large to be presented in this way.
b) B′(σb) > B
′(σn).
In case a) the unidirectional collaborations are as attractive as targets for investments
as bidirectional collaborations. In typical networks, where all remaining links receive
investments above the IP this implies σb = σn = σ. Furthermore, in case a)
the stationarity condition, Eq. (4), requires that C ′(Σb) = C
′(Σn), which stipulates
Σb = Σn =: Σ. Therefore the whole component consists of agents making an investment
Σ and links receiving an investment σ.
Conservation of investments within a component implies lσ = nΣ and hence
〈k〉 = 2
l
n
= 2
Σ
σ
. (8)
We know further that Σ/σ = Σn/σn = m ∈ N, where m is the number of outgoing
links of an agent in the nBCC. Inserting Σ/σ = m in Eq.(8) yields 〈k〉 = 2m, showing
that unidirectional links that are as attractive as bidirectional links can only occur
in components in which mean degree, 〈k〉, is an integer multiple of 2. This matches
the numerical data displayed in Fig. 7a, which shows that σn/σb = 1 is observed in
components with 〈k〉 = 2 and 〈k〉 = 4.
It is remarkable that observing σn = σb in a pair of collaborations is sufficient to
determine the mean degree of the whole component. Moreover components in which the
mean degree is exactly 2 have to consist of a single cycle potentially with trees attached.
In the numerical investigations we mostly observe cycles of bidirectional links to which
trees of unidirectional links are attached, as shown in Fig. 8b.
In case b) the bidirectional links are more attractive targets for investments than
unidirectional links. In typical networks with σb, σn ≥ σIP this implies σb < σn.
Now the stationarity condition, Eq. (4), demands that C ′(Σb) > C
′(Σn), so that
unidirectional links receive a higher investment than bidirectional links. By contrast
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the total investment made by an agent investing in bidirectional links is higher than the
one made by agents investing in unidirectional links, i.e.
σb < σn ≤ Σn < Σb. (9)
This relationship restricts the connectivity in the BCC to 〈k〉BCC := 2Σb/σb > 2,
which implies 〈k〉 > 2, because the mean degree of the component cannot be smaller
than 2 if a subcomponent already has a degree greater than 2. Therefore, we find
that unidirectional links that are less attractive than bidirectional links only occur in
components in which the mean degree is larger than 2, but not an integer multiple of 2
(cf. Fig. 7a). As such links are only found at k¯ beyond the giant component transition
they occur typically in large components as shown in Fig. 1.
In numerical investigations, we also observe some unidirectional links in components
with 〈k〉 < 2 (cf. Fig. 7b). To explain these we have to consider case b) but relax the
assumption that both, σn and σb are above the IP. Thus, we obtain case c), about
which we know that the unidirectional links are less attractive than bidirectional links,
Σn < Σb, and that the unidirectional link only receives investments from one agent,
i.e., σn ≤ Σn. Moreover, 〈k〉 < 2 implies 〈k〉BCC < 2 and therefore Σb < σb. Therefore
σn ≤ Σn < Σb < σb, (10)
which shows that unidirectional links can only appear in components with 〈k〉 < 2 if
the investment received by unidirectional links is smaller than the investment received
by bidirectional links. Satisfying σn < σb and B
′(σn) < B
′(σb) simultaneously requires
σn < σIP. The components with 〈k〉 < 2, in which such links are found, are trees formed
by a core of bidirectional links, to which individual agents are attached by unidirectional
links (Fig. 8a). Chains of unidirectional links, as we have observed in case a), cannot
appear for 〈k〉 < 2 as this would mean that some agents would have one incoming and
one outgoing link below the IP, which is ruled out by a trivial extension of the reasoning
from Sec. 2.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a model for the formation of complex collaboration
networks between self-interested agents. In this model the evolving network is described
by a large system of deterministic differential equations allowing agents to maintain
different levels of cooperation with different partners.
We showed analytically that bidirectionally communities are formed, in which every
agent makes the same total investment and every collaboration provides the same
benefit. In contrast to models for cooperation on discrete networks, the present model
thereby exhibits a high degree of coordination which can be interpreted as a precursor
of a social norm. We emphasized that coordination is generally achieved although single
agents possess insufficient information for computing the total investment made by any
other agent and although the level of cooperation that is reached in a community is not
fixed rigidly by external constraints.
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Despite the high degree of coordination, we observed the appearance of privileged
agents, reminiscent of the leaders emergind in [27]. In the model proposed in the present
paper, the privileged agents hold distinguished topological positions of high degree
centrality allowing them to extract much higher payoffs than other agents, while making
the same cooperative investment. However, we found that in the absence of further
mechanism reinforcing differences the assembled topologies were fairer than random
graphs.
Although our primary aim was to investigate the formation of social networks, some
aspects of the behavior of social agents are reminiscent of results reported in psychology.
For instance our investigation showed that agents can react to the withdrawal of
investment by a partner either by mutual withdrawal of resources or by reinforcing
the collaboration with increased investment. Our analysis provides a rational which
links the expected response to the withdrawal of resources to an inflection point of an
assumed benefit function.
Furthermore, we investigated under which conditions non-reciprocated collabora-
tions appear. Here, our analysis revealed that such unidirectional collaborations can
appear in three distinct scenarios, which can be linked to topological properties of the
evolving networks. In particular exploited agents whose investments are not reciprocated
invest less than the average amount of resources in their links when occurring in small
components, but more than the average amount, when integrated in large components.
We believe that the results from the proposed model can be verified in laboratory
experiments in which humans interact via a computer network. Such experiments may
confirm the topological properties of the self-organized networks reported here and may
additionally provide insights into the perceived cost and benefit functions that humans
attach to social interactions.
Furthermore, results of the proposed model may be verified by comparison with
data on collaboration networks between people, firms or nations. This comparison may
necessitate modifications of the model to allow for instance for slightly different cost
functions for the players. Most of these extensions are straight forward and should not
alter the predictions of the model qualitatively. For instance in the case of heterogeneous
cost functions, players will make different total investments, but will still approach
an operating point in which the slope of their cost function is identical. Further,
coordination should persist even if the network of potential collaborations is not fully
connected. Finally, but perhaps most importantly our analytical results do not rely
heavily on the assumption that only two agents participate in each collaboration. Most
of the results can therefore be straight-forwardly extended to the case of multi-agent
collaborations.
Our analytical treatment suggests that the central assumption responsible for the
emergence of coordination is that the benefit of a collaboration is shared between the
collaborating agents, but is independent of their other collaborations, whereas the cost
incurred by an agent’s investment depends on the sum of all of an agent’s investments.
Because this assumption seems to hold in a relatively large range of applications we
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believe that also the emergence of coordination and leaders by the mechanisms described
here should be observable in a wide range of systems.
The analysis presented in this paper has profited greatly from the dual nature
of the model, combining aspects of dynamical systems and complex network theory.
In particular our analytical investigations were based on the application of Jacobi’s
signature criterion to the system’s Jacobian matrix. Apart from the symmetry of the
Jacobian, this ‘double-Jacobi’ approach does not depend on specific features of model
under consideration. The same approach can therefore be used to address significant
extensions of the present model. We therefore believe that also beyond the field of social
interactions, the double-Jacobi approach will prove to be a useful tool for the analytical
exploration of the weighted adaptive networks that appear in many applications.
Appendix A. Stability condition
To determine the local asymptotic stability of the steady states we study the Jacobian
matrix J ∈ RN(N−1)×N(N−1) defined by J(ij)(kl) = ∂ ˙eij/∂ekl. The terms contained in this
matrix can be grouped into three different types
Aij :=
∂ ˙eij
∂eij
=
∂2
(∂eij)2
B (σij)−
∂2
(∂eij)
2C (Σi) (A.1)
Pij :=
∂ ˙eij
∂eji
=
∂
∂eji
∂
∂eij
B (σij) (A.2)
Ki :=
∂ ˙eij
∂eil
= −
∂
∂eil
∂
∂eij
C (Σi) (A.3)
albeit evaluated at different points. For reasons of symmetry
∂
∂eji
∂
∂eij
B (σij) =
∂2
(∂eij)
2 B (σij) =: B
′′ (σij)
∂
∂eil
∂
∂eij
C (Σi) =
∂2
(∂eij)
2 C (Σi) =: C
′′ (Σi) ,
and consequentially Pij = Pji, and Aij = Pij +Ki. Ordering the variables according to
the mapping M : N×N→ N; (i, j)→ N(i− 1) + j the Jacobian can be written in the
form
J =


A12 K1 P12 0 0 0
K1 A13 0 0 P13 0
P12 0 A21 K2 0 0
0 0 K2 A23 0 P23
0 P13 0 0 A31 K3
0 0 0 P23 K3 A32


,
which is shown here for N = 3. As each cooperation ij is determined by a
pair of variables (eij , eji), each Pij occurs twice forming quadratic subunits with the
corresponding entries Aij and Aji. Subsequently, we restrict ourselves to the submatrix
Js of J, which only captures variables eij belonging to ‘non-vanishing’ links. As argued
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before, ‘vanishing links’, i.e. links with σij = 0, are subject to stationarity condition
(5). If C ′ (Σi) > B
′ (0), their stability is due to the boundary condition eij ≥ 0 and is
independent of the second derivatives of C and B. Hence, they can be omitted from the
subsequent analysis. This means in particular that the spectra of different topological
components of the network decouple and can thus be treated independently.
All eigenvalues of the real, symmetric matrix Js are real. According to Jacobi’s
signature criterion the number of negative eigenvalues equals the number of changes
of sign in the sequence 1, D1, . . . , Dr where r is the rank of J
s and Dq := det (J
s
ik),
i, k = 1, . . . , q [51]. In a stable system the sequence has to alternate in every step. A
necessary condition for stability is therefore alternation in the first steps 1, D1, D2.
By means of an even number of column and row interchanges the above stated form
of Js can always be transformed such that the first 2× 2 block reads(
Aij Pij
Pij Aji
)
.
Since we assume that ij is a non-vanishing link, and, hence, i and j to be in the same
component, both agents make the same total investment Σ. It follows from definition
(A.3) that Ki = Kj =: K and therewith that Aij = Aji. Thus, the sequence 1, D1, D2
alternates if
D1 = Pij +K < 0 ∧ (A.4)
D2 = (2Pij +K)K > 0. (A.5)
Equation (A.5) stipulates thatK and (2Pij +K) have the same sign. Of the two possible
scenarios
(2Pij +K) , K < 0 and (2Pij +K) , K > 0 (A.6)
the second is ruled out by Eq. (A.4): If K > 0, it follows from Eq. (A.4) that
Pij < −K < 0, which contradicts (2Pij +K) > 0. Hence, the necessary conditions
for stability, Eqs. (A.4), (A.5), require
K < 0 ∧ (2Pij +K) < 0 . (A.7)
If either agent i or agent j has another bilateral link, say ik, it is furthermore
possible to transform Js by an even number of row and line interchanges such that the
first 2× 2 block reads(
Aij K
K Aik
)
. (A.8)
In this representation the sequence 1, D1, D2 alternates if
D1 = Aij = Pij +K < 0 (A.9)
D2 = PikPij + (Pik + Pij)K > 0. (A.10)
Condition (A.10) can then be written as
PikPij > −K (Pik + Pij) . (A.11)
Inserting the definitions Eqs.(A.1)-(A.3) in Eqs. (A.7) and (A.11) yields the stability
conditions cited in the main text as Eqs. (6)-(7).
REFERENCES 19
References
[1] Axelrod R and Hamilton WD 1981 Science 211 1390–1396
[2] Doebeli M, Hauert C and Killingback T 2004 Science 306 859–862
[3] Nowak MA and Sigmund K 2004 Science 303 793–799
[4] Nowak MA 2006 Science 314 1560–1563
[5] Axelrod R 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books)
[6] Nowak MA and May RM 1992 Nature 92 826–829
[7] Burtsev M and Turchin P 2006 Nature 440 1041–1044
[8] Hauert C and Doebeli M 2004 Nature 428 643–646
[9] Egu´ıluz VM, Zimmerman MG, Cela–Conde CJ and San Miguel M 2005 Am. J. Soc.
110(4) 977–1008
[10] Santos FC and Pacheco JM 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 0981041–4
[11] Ohtsuki H, Hauert C, Lieberman E and Nowak MA 2006 Nature 441 502–505
[12] Santos FC, Santos MD and Pacheco JM 2008 Nature 454 213–216
[13] Macy MW 1991 Am. J. Soc. 97(3) 808–843
[14] Gould RV 1993 Am. Soc. Rev. 58(2) 182–196
[15] Willers D 1999 Network Exchange Theory (Westport: Praeger)
[16] Fehr E and Fischbacher U 2003 Nature 425 785–791
[17] Palla G, Baraba´si AL and Vicsek T 2007 Nature 446 664–667
[18] Braha D and Bar-Yam Y 2009 Adaptive Networks (Heidelberg: Springer) 39–50
[19] Gross T and Blasius B 2008 JRS Interface 5 259–271
[20] Gross T and Sayama H (Eds.) 2009 Adaptive Networks: Theory, Models, and Data
(Heidelberg: Springer)
[21] Ashlock D, Smucker MD, Stanley EA and Tesfatsion L 1996 BioSystems 37 99–125
[22] Bala V and Goyal S 2001 J. Econ. Theory 17 101–120
[23] Bornholdt S and Rohlf T 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 84 6114
[24] Pascuski M, Bassler KE and Corral A 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 84 3185–3188
[25] For a collection of respective publications see
http://adaptive-networks.wikidot.com/publications
[26] Skyrms B and Pemantle R 2000 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 97 9340–9346
[27] Zimmermann MG, Egu´ıluz VM San Miguel M and Spadaro A 2000 Adv. Complex
Syst. 3 283–297
[28] Zimmermann MG, Egu´ıluz VM and San Miguel M 2004 Phys. Rev. E 69 065102
[29] Zimmermann MG and Egu´ıluz VM 2005 Phys. Rev. E 72 056118
[30] Fu F, Wu T and Wang L 2008 Phys. Rev. E 79 036101
[31] Pacheco JM, Traulsen A and Nowak MA 2006 J. Theor. Biol. 243 437–443
REFERENCES 20
[32] Pacheco JM, Traulsen A and Nowak MA 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 97 2581031–4
[33] Szolnoki A, Perc M and Danku Z 2008 Euro. Phys. Lett. 84 50007
[34] Van Segbroeck S, Santos FC, Lenaerts T and Pacheco JM 2009 Phys. Rev. Lett.
102 058105
[35] Szolnoki A and Perc M 2009 EPL 86 30007
[36] Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Flor´ıa LM, Sa´nchez A and Moreno Y 2008 PLoS
one 3 e2449
[37] Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Traulsen A and Moreno Y 2009 New J. Phys. 11
083031
[38] Fu F, Wu T and Wang L 2009 Phys. Rev. E 79 036101
[39] Suzuki R, Kato M and Arita T 2008 Phys. Rev. E 77 021911
[40] Ebel H and Bornholdt S 2002 Preprint arXiv:cond-mat/0211666
[41] Zschaler G, Traulsen A and Gross T 2009 Preprint arXiv:0910.0940
[42] Biely C, Dragosits K and Thurner S 2007 Physica D 228 40–48
[43] Szolnoki A and Perc M 2009 New J. Phys. 11 093033
[44] Koenig MD, Battiston S, Napoletano M and Schweitzer F 2008 Preprint CER-ETH
Working Paper 08/95
[45] Tomassini M, Pestelacci E and Luthi L 2010 Biosystems 99 50–59
[46] Oliver P, Marwell G and Teixeira R 1985 Am. J. Sociol. 91 522–556
[47] Heckathorn DD 1996 Am. Soc. Rev. 61 250–277
[48] This can be shown by taking determinants Dq with q > 2 into account.
[49] Baxter LA 1984 J Soc. Pers. Relat. 1 29–48
[50] Newman ME 2003 SIAM Review 45 167–256
[51] Zeidler E, Hackbusch W, Schwarz HR and Hunt B 2004 Oxford User’s Guide to
Mathematics (New York: Oxford University Press)
